If you wish to have an honest conversation with someone shouldn't the discourse be grounded in facts?
I present to you pages one and two of Cannon's ruling. I figured not to overwhelm you with the entire document all at one. Bite size chunks for the faint of mind I always say
And it reads
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION CASE NO. 23-80101-CR-CANNON UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
,
Plaintiff, v.
DONALD J. TRUMP
,
WALTINE NAUTA
, and
CARLOS DE OLIVEIRA
, Defendants. /
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT BASED ON APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE VIOLATION
Former President Trump’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment Based on the Unlawful Appointment and Funding of Special Counsel Jack Smith is
GRANTED
in accordance with this Order
[ECF No. 326]. The Superseding Indictment is
DISMISSED
because Special Counsel Smith’s appointment violates the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Special Counsel Smith’s use of a permanent indefinite appropriation also violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, but the Court need not address the proper remedy for that funding violation given the dismissal on Appointments Clause grounds. The effect of this Order is confined to this proceeding.
INTRODUCTION
The Motion before the Court challenges the legality of Special Counsel Smith (hereinafter, “Special Counsel Smith” or “Special Counsel”) in two consequential respects, both of which are matters of first impression in this Circuit, and both of which must be resolved before this
Case 9:23-cr-80101-AMC Document 672 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/15/2024 Page 1 of 93
2 prosecution proceeds further [ECF No. 326]. The first is a challenge to his appointment under the Appointments Clause, which provides the exclusive means for appointing “Officers of the United States.” Article II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause sets as a default rule that all “Officers of the United States”—whether “inferior” or “principal”—must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Id.
It then goes on to direct that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in Heads of Departments.”
Id.
For purposes of this Order, the Court accepts the Special Counsel’s contested view that he qualifies as an “inferior Officer,” not a “principal” one, although the Court expresses reservations about that proposition and addresses those arguments below. The Motion’s second challenge is rooted in the Appropriations Clause, which prohibits any money from being “drawn from the Treasury” unless such funding has been appropriated by an act of Congress. Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. . . .”). Both the Appointments and Appropriations challenges as framed in the Motion raise the following threshold question: is there a statute in the United States Code that authorizes the appointment of Special Counsel Smith to conduct this prosecution? After careful study of this seminal issue, the answer is no. None of the statutes cited as legal authority for the appointment— 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533—gives the Attorney General broad inferior-officer appointing power or bestows upon him the right to appoint a federal officer with the kind of prosecutorial power wielded by Special Counsel Smith. Nor do the Special Counsel’s strained statutory arguments, appeals to inconsistent history, or reliance on out-of-circuit authority persuade otherwise
Let's pick it apart together. Where in these two pages do you see a glaring deviation from standard legal principle? if none, simply say none and we will move on to pages 3 and 4.
